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Session 1B
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. Hello everyone, we're starting now
apparently. IB, key current IP issues, reflections, and analysis. We have an
incredible panel here, looking forward to hear them all and all of the discussion.
We're going to start out with Paul. As you know, as I discussed, we don't give
backgrounds to anybody and speakers. You can get their resumes and all the other
things on the website, this gives us more time to just go straight into the
discussion. Paul, formerly, Court of Appeals for the federal circuit, big
muckamuck now out in the real world. First question, Paul, what are you doing
actually, day-to-day?
PAUL R. MICHEL: Mediations, arbitrations, mock trials, many moot
courts, strategy advice, testifying in front of Congress, and writing articles for the
general media to try to educate people about IP systems, particularly the patent
system.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Wow. Very impressive. Compare this to your life, I
guess, of leisure as a chief judge of the court, which do you prefer? If you had to
do only that for your whole life?
PAUL R. MICHEL: I like the change. It's been an exciting 11 years. The
variety is great. I've been able to learn much from investors and inventors, and
scientists, and economists, and all sorts of people that I had very little contact with
when I was on the court. There you're mostly conferring with litigators and
reading and listening to what litigators present. It's been very educational, kind of
inspiring, and it's given me a much broader perspective, so I'd hate to have to
choose. It was good doing the one for 22 years and now the other for 11 years.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay, great answer. Okay. Why don't you start Paul?
PAUL R. MICHEL: All right. I want to talk about injunctions and their
availability, really unavailability. It applies to all types of IP, but I'm going to
concentrate on patents, as an example. My thesis is that in the United States, as
virtually everywhere else, the patent system operates primarily, as a licensing
system, not by litigation. But it’s licensing that's encouraged by the possibility of
litigation and the possibility of injunctions. It's a two-way incentive system. It's
meant to encourage inventors and investors to innovate, but it's also meant to
encourage users of another's patented technology to license.
This is the way it has to be because courts can't possibly do all the work
themselves. For example, in the United States every year, about 5,000
infringement complaints are filed, but only a 100 or 200 can actually be tried to
conclusion in the courts, and maybe another 100 or 200 are resolved by summary
judgment. Obviously, the vast majority of cases must settle and must end in
licensing or surrender by the patent owner. So, the courts just cannot try
thousands of cases per year. Therefore, the availability of injunctions in those
cases that are litigated becomes critically important, because it drives the
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licensing decisions of all the people not yet in litigation, or newly in litigation,
who are looking for a way out.
Now by contrast to the US, where injunctions used to be routine but now
are very rare, in Europe, in the UK, in China and elsewhere injunctions are
routine. In the US, out of several hundred valid verdicts a year, there are only a
couple dozen permanent injunctions issued post-trial. You can see how much of
an outlier we are. It obviously ultimately traces back to the page and a half
concurrence by Justice Kennedy in the infamous eBay case. There he speculated,
and made statements that were unexplained and undocumented, three in
particular.
He said, injunctions, "Can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge
exorbitant fees." Secondly, "When the threat of an injunction is employed simply
for undue leverage, legal damages may well be sufficient.” What about due
leverage? Third, he said, "And an injunction may not serve the public interest."
Well, it may not, but I would suggest in many situations it may. What happened
was lower courts, trial courts gradually read Kennedy's use of the word “may” as:
“ usually, routinely, almost always.”
The result was that, even after judgments of infringement, injunctions are
very rarely issued. So, courts on their own authority from Congress, in my
opinion, have converted the right to exclude, the IP right to exclude, patents,
copyrights, and the rest, into a kind of compulsory licensing regime and critically
one run, not by business leaders, but by judges and that's a whole problem in and
of itself. Consider that patents particularly are explicitly called, a part of
intellectual property and indeed in the statute, the Patent Act, are expressly termed
property. §261 says, patents shall have "The attributes of personal property". That
was the mandate by Congress. But the Supreme Court has converted the patent
right into a little more than a ticket to sue. Meaning the patent owner can spend
many years and many millions of dollars and litigate simultaneously in the Patent
Trial and Appeal board in an IPR in order to try to enforce the patents. Often the
damages, even for post-verdict infringement are the same as, or little more, than
the licensing fee that a licensor would have taken, back at the start. The
technology user is getting, a real bargain in this situation.
Consider the contrast over time. In the 1990s, IBM licensed tens of
thousands of its patents to willing licensees and the license fees totaled billions of
dollars per year, and in a couple of years, it was the primary source of profit for
IBM in that era. They never had to file a single lawsuit because there was an
honor system then where users of technology willingly took licenses. That has
totally changed.
Consider another example, I was involved along with many others, in an
attempt to create a stock market for licensing patent rights. It was called IP
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Exchange International. It was going to be computerized, totally transparent,
entirely market-driven, and provide low fees for use on a per-use basis. They had
six key portfolios, and they were being widely used by numerous implementers.
All the implementers’ officials admitted internally that the patents looked valid
and that they were using the technology and therefore were infringing.
They suggested because the licenses were so cheap and you could sell
back what you didn't use because it was on a pro use basis, that the companies
involved should take a license, and even the CEOs in most cases agreed. Then
what happened? They talked to their outside litigation counsel and the litigation
counsel told them, "Do not take a license. You don't need to take a license. Many
owners cannot afford to enforce the patents against you. Even those who can, you
can have a very good chance of getting an IPR instituted and a very high level of
invalidation occurs there. You may prevail at trial. At worst you'll pay a normal
licensing fee many years later."
Of course IPXI, the stock market that would've been a great innovation in
the patent licensing world, completely collapsed. What's happened downstream in
terms of effects? Consider venture capital investment in serious technologies, real
technologies. These levels tend to reflect the strength of patents as measured by
the size and timing of awards of damages, and particularly by the availability of
injunctions. When injunctions were routine, venture capital money flowed into
technology like crazy. Now, much of it is being diverted into entertainment and
hospitality, and other non-technology uses.
Because injunctions are still routine in China and Europe, U.S. VC money
is now flowing overseas in a way it never did before. Previously regarding U.S.
VC money, 85% or more was spent in the U.S. Now that level is down to 50%
and there's much documentation of this in reports by the U.S. Inventors for Jobs,
in a recent book by a patent academic/economist, Jonathan Barnett at the
University of Southern California, and many other reports. The particular brunt,
the impact here has been very harsh on smaller players; startups, universities,
hospitals, research institutes, small and emerging companies.
Yet these are vital players, not the only important players, but vital players
in the innovation ecosystem and historically most breakthrough innovations were
done by these smaller, newer, nimbler entities.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay, Paul. Time is up and we're very strict on that.
Thank you. Panel discussion questions for Paul. Give him your discussion period
so he can finish.
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: Okay, so I've got a question for Paul. What's the
answer?
PAUL R. MICHEL: Well, the answer is the U.S. judges should imitate trial
judges in England and the other jurisdictions I mentioned, and injunctions in
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appropriate cases, which would be the norm, should issue. That will incentivize
licensing not only by the party before the court at the moment, but by many other
parties who are aware of the proceeding. We should return to what we used to do.
The UK should continue to do what it continues to do. I'm very envious,
particularly of Germany and China that seem to do everything very well.
HUGH C. HANSEN: What is interesting to me is not in the original
opinion, not in your discussion now, not in concurring a decision, or opinions. No
one mentioned that the constitution says exclusive right, Article 1, Section 8,
clause 8, an exclusive right is not what is going on now. Why hasn't anyone said,
the constitution says this and the author of the opinion you're talking about of
which Kennedy was concurring is "an originalist." He did not mention what the
constitution said when that's almost part of his life, is we got to go back there.
Why is that not anyone bringing that into the discussion, do you think?
PAUL R. MICHEL: Well Hugh, I've brought it up in 35 articles that I've
written in the last two or three years. I bring it up every time, it's an exclusive
right, it's a negative right. It's the opposite of the old British system, which was
the king granted a company the sole right to manufacture a given product. They
had to a manufacturer under the so-called “working requirement”, or their patents
were void.
HUGH C. HANSEN: But you didn't bring up the constitution in your
discussion now, and no one brings it up. I mean, you may have done it in your
articles, but if you look at any cases on this, no one is bringing up that constitution
actually says it and therefore Congress can't, even if it's a good idea, supposedly
not give an exclusive right. Anyway, IPAUL R. MICHEL: The problem with that is that not every case should
yield an injunction. I think it should be the norm as it was here and remains
elsewhere, but there are exceptions because it's a exercise of equitable discretion
by judges, which is appropriate. If there are strong, strong equities against issuing
an injunction, or at least delaying or narrowing its impact, that's perfectly
appropriate. That doesn't mean you've totally trashed the exclusive right system; it
just means exceptions in extreme circumstancesHUGH C. HANSEN: But at least you mention, okay, we're making an
exception from the constitutional command, because of these good reasons. Right
now no one is doing that. It's almost like it could be a common law case and
everyone is just saying what should be done and everything else. I guess what the
bottom line is, and as a legal realist I know this, don't think the constitution is
going to have a lot to do with anything today, but I'm surprised that more people
on the patent side don't actually raise that. That's a very good point, Paul.
Any other thoughts, we're going to have a discussion at the end, so we can
come back to this, but with timing, this stage and Paul's time is up, both the
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discussion. Paul, if you could bring a lawsuit, would you sue for lack of time?
Appropriate time for your talk?
PAUL R. MICHEL: [Chuckles] No, I very much like compressing talks
into five or six or seven minutes. I think it's a great idea. It makes people think
harder, compress more. All lawyers should learn to present much more concisely
than they do if they're left to their own devices. I entirely applaud your strict
management and judges should do the same more often than they do in my
opinion.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. Our next speaker is as you can see on the
screen, the Honorable Denny Chin, who is currently a judge. How do you like
being a judge Denny, basically just between you and me?
DENNY CHIN: Well, if you ask me to talk about 27 years of judging and
what's changed, but I'm still enjoying it very much. I will try to compress my
remarks into six minutes. I thought I had seven, but I'll make do with six.
HUGH C. HANSEN: No, it was seven, but then we switched to six. Hold
on, hold on, hold on. Learn, debate, have fun, and adapt. We have now added
adapt to what this conference is giving to everybody. Okay. All right. Go on.
DENNY CHIN: I will adapt.
HUGH C. HANSEN: All right. All yours. Now start it.
DENNY CHIN: What's changed in 27 years of judging, from my
perspective? The biggest change for me personally, is to shift from trial court to
the appellate court. I was a trial judge for almost 16 years, I've now been an
appellate judge for more than 11 years. I miss the action of the trial court. As the
great Judge Weinfeld put it, I miss rubbing elbows with the people. I heard
another judge describe difference between the trial court and the appellate court,
as the difference between searching for truth and searching for error. It's a lot
more fun searching for the truth.
I've tried to hold on to some aspects of being a trial judge. I've actually
tried 10 cases as a circuit judge sitting by designation in the Southern District of
New York. Another big change personally is that I took senior status last June,
and I'm no longer presiding. I'm no longer writing summary orders. I have a little
more time and I'm trying to spend more of it now here at Fordham. There have
certainly been changes in the docket and the case law load over the course of my
time in the trial court and also on the appellate court.
In the early years in the trial court, I was trying 20 to 25 cases a year. I
tried my first case two weeks after I was confirmed as a district judge, and over
time, the number of trials dropped significantly. My last couple of years as a trial
judge, I was trying perhaps five, or six trials a year, and it wasn't just me, it was
other colleagues in the Southern District and, nationally, it was true as well. In the
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circuit court when I started in 2010, active judges on the court were being given
44 days of sittings, and on each day we'd hear four or five, six cases.
I understood that some years earlier, the judges had 55 days of sittings.
Well, the number has dropped steadily over the course of my time on the circuit.
This year an active judge took 33 days only. I took an 80% caseload as a senior,
so I sat 28 days. Then next year, the number's going to go down to 30 days and
I've actually asked for a full load to go up to 30 because I've got to keep my law
clerks busy.
In terms of IP cases, a recent report of the administrative office says that
the overall number of IP cases has increased dramatically over the 20 years or so
before the report, at least for patent and copyright. The lines are not steady, there
were fluctuations along the way, apparently affected by legislation or case law,
but overall, copyright and patent cases are way up from where they were 20 to 25
years ago. Trademark cases, however, have remained relatively consistent, so
while filings are down in the circuit courts in general, they are up in the federal
circuit.
Another area where there has been tremendous change is technology.
When I started in 1994, I barely had a mobile phone. It was a personal one. It took
some years for the court even to give me a court device and it was a Blackberry.
Lawyers were still running around trying to serve hard copies of papers and then
they had to hustle to get to the courthouse before the doors closed at five o'clock.
The presentation of evidence at trial consisted of the large black binders filled
with exhibits. Sometimes lawyers used an Elmo, that was an overhead projector
for those of you who are younger. The government might use a Velcro pad and
stick up mug shots of the different members of the conspiracy.
Electronic filing was introduced in the 1990s and made life easier for
lawyers, but also greater access for the public. Now, of course, we have computer
monitors, in the jury box and things are done very differently. Technology
continued to evolve and thankfully during the pandemic, we had Zoom, we were
hearing arguments by Zoom, we were live streaming our arguments. I'm pleased
to say that the pandemic has killed the fax machine in the second circuit. We were
still using the fax machine until the pandemic hit. I remember going in after a
period of time and my machine was out of paper. There were sheets of paper
flying all over.
It's not just how we do things. The technology has impacted our
decision-making substantively. We've had to apply decades-old statutes to the
evolving and new technologies. I remember early on having a peer-to-peer music
downloading case, and then over the years I had Cable Vision, Google books, and
Aereo cases that keep evolving and raising these issues. Another area is the
demographics. When I was appointed in 1994, I became only the fourth or fifth
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Asian American Article III judge in the whole country. When I was appointed to
the circuit in 2010, I became the only active Asian American circuit judge in the
country.
I'm pleased to say there's been a lot of progress. Today there are 12 active
Asian American judges in the circuit courts. There are now 33 active district
judges of Asian American descent, so there's been a lot of progress, but the bench
is still overwhelmingly white, 71%, and male, 64%, so there is still room for
improvement. I'll stop there Hugh.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. How long have you been Asian American?
DENNY CHIN: Well, not my entire life because I was born in Hong Kong
and came to this country as a child.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Yes, but when you were first coming around and I
first knew you, those labels, no one would have said, "Oh, Denny's Asian
American," or anything. At some point, and you seem to think it's a good idea,
we're saying more and more that this person is an Asian American and this or this.
The reason for that is if you don't do that, some people are not going to be treated
properly or what? What's the reason for that?
DENNY CHIN: Well, it's a complicated question that will take more than
five minutes, but I think diversity in the profession is incredibly important. I think
diversity on the bench is incredibly important. I think the quality of justice is
better if the bench is more reflective of society. I certainly do not believe in quotas
and hard numbers or anything like that, but I think when judges have a better
understanding of life, their decisions will be truer. I think if you show some
empathy, appreciate where people have come from, I think you'll listen better,
you'll pay more attention, and I think, in the end, justice will be better.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. By the way, Denny is staying at Fordham in
his honorable position, I think, we just created of in residence at Fordham and
we're very, very happy. He's always in residence because he's been teaching as an
adjunct.
DENNY CHIN: I've been given a title now, Distinguished Jurist in
Residence, but more important than a title is an office, I finally have an office, so
I'm in my office here at Fordham.
HUGH C. HANSEN: How long are you going to be this distinguished
judge? The rest of your life?
DENNY CHIN: I don't know. We'll see. I'm enjoying it so far, a lot.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Do they pay you anything for that?
DENNY CHIN: Yes, they do.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Is that proper?
DENNY CHIN: One of the benefits of taking senior status, by the way, is
as an active judge, there's a limit on how much you can earn teaching, for

8

Session 1B
example. When you become a senior judge, you're in essence retired, your salary
becomes pension, but the cap is gone, so you can be paid more money.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. By the way, you probably have more money
than you know what to do. If that's the case, just think of the IP Institute every
once in a while as a possible source of sharing. Great. Panel, any thoughts on
what Denny has said, or done?
RICHARD ARNOLD: I would like to know the answer to the mystery that
Denny posed to us, which is case numbers are way up, but sitting days are way
down. How does that compute?
DENNY CHIN: Well, I don't know. I mean, I think the numbers in the
court of appeals are down, but the numbers in the trial court are up. I looked at the
statistics yesterday, the filings in the trial courts, I think, were up 32%, and yet we
have fewer appeals. I'm not sure what accounts for that. Some of it is the way-RICHARD ARNOLD: But you also said trials?
DENNY CHIN: Well, the trials are definitely down, even though the
filings are up. Part of it, I think, is-- there are different explanations. I think the
number of trials went down after 9/11. I think law enforcement was directing their
attentions elsewhere. We've had changes in sentencing law. There's a lot more
discretion in sentencing now that the guidelines are no longer mandatory. I think
you'd see more litigation over sentencing issues, but more people are pleading
guilty and not going to trial.
I think there have been improvements in management techniques, and
judges are better at settling cases and getting cases resolved before trial. It also
could be Iqbal v. Twombly, it's a little bit easier now to grant a 12(b)(6) motion
because there's a plausibility requirement. So when you look at all these things,
they probably all contribute to the reduction in the number of trials. Litigation has
become so expensive that if you take a case all the way, it's so expensive, you're
better off resolving it.
HUGH C. HANSEN: It sounds pretty horrible, actually, Denny. Is this
like, "Oh, my God," or it's okay because ultimately people are getting the right
decisions or what?
DENNY CHIN: Well, you know I always thought it was better if parties
resolve the cases between themselves.
HUGH C. HANSEN: In fact, you're actually someone-- I think you used
to say, "The world would be better if you settled every case."
DENNY CHIN: I don't know that I said that because I enjoyed the trials.
Sometimes, you don't want to see parties compromise too much, simply because
the other side is wearing them down and making it too expensive. I think, for the
most part, if the parties can agree on a resolution, that's better off than going all
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the way and spending all that money, and having a jury make that hard decision
which is probably not really going to make anyone happy.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. Thank you very much. Well, He Jing?
HE JING: Hey, Hugh.
HUGH C. HANSEN: How are you?
HE JING: All right.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Where are you physically right now? Denny, by the
way, what floor are you on?
DENNY CHIN: I'm on the seventh floor.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Oh, that's my floor. If I ever went to school
anymore, we can actually-DENNY CHIN: Come to school and see me.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Yes, exactly. He Jing, where are you if I may ask?
HE JING: I'm in Beijing in my office.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay and how are things going there for you right
now?
HE JING: Well, work side is good. I'm just a little bit disappointed,
actually quite disappointed for canceling my trip to the US. I was thinking about
coming out at the end of April, but there are way too much uncertainty how I'm
ever going to be able to come back.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Let me say this, don't go back.
HE JING: I guess I wasn't going to say it, so I'll end up being a U.S. judge,
right?
HUGH C. HANSEN: Yes. I know you were thinking of opening a law
firm in the United States. This is a perfect time.
HE JING: Hey, if I never [crosstalk]
HUGH C. HANSEN: The demand for you right now is always going to be
high, but since everyone is locked in there, can't move everything. You're going to
be there in hopefully New York, but maybe Washington, or West Coast, God
forbid. You're going to just wipe. It's going to be incredible.
HE JING: Hugh, you're very nice and kind.
HUGH C. HANSEN: In any case, we can discuss that later and I'm giving
you advice for a reason, because I think when you start making the big bucks, you
might remember, who gave you the advice early on in this situation. All right.
Okay, so it's all yours.
HE JING: Thank you, so great to be here, be back at Fordham. Very happy
to be one of the Chinese friends of the Institute and also Hugh. Today I'm going to
be talking about what's going on in China. It's really my personal view being
someone doing all this work for over 20 years. Right now we are in a very special
time. One of the big term that I'm even learning myself, I spend quite a bit of time
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grappling with what is big IP protection, which is really touted as the key the
government theme this days in China, the big IP protection. I think I discovered
something, that's why I come here to share with our friends here.
I think fundamentally the first thing is coming from the current view of IP
in China. When I was starting learning Chinese IP back in 1994, for the most part
in the last nearly 30 years, here in China, we think IP is really about private rights.
It's really about because of trade. China protect the IP in order to attract foreign
investments. We want to be getting market access in U.S. in Europe. We want to
make it in order to protect IP, we want to get more money, we want to make it.
That's why it's really to follow the US, China negotiate, or the trade negotiation,
look at the new rules, all the things, improving.
Now in the last two or three years, especially since the Trump
administration, I think the view about IP is starting to shift. It's no longer about
making it, it's more about winning it. We need a competition game that we think
that Trump or now a Biden impose on us. This is really geopolitical side. In
China, we now sayin IP actually equal-- IP equals innovation, but probably don't
be too excited about it. When we linked IP to innovation, we really see our
government sees IP as a "strategic resource for international competition."
It sounds very fancy, but what it really says, my personal view, is that how
the government, how China can use IP to win against the U.S. Why? Because the
underlying concern is that or even a consensus, we have a consensus here in
China. We have a consensus that U.S. politicians have a consensus that U.S. is
determined to decouple with China, at least on the technology side, on technology
innovation. Probably U.S. has not a major consensus about the trade, decoupling
China from the trade, but there's a consensus in China that Americans have a
consensus that they are decoupling China on the innovation side. That create a
huge amount of concerns.
One thing is that China decided, well if we are decoupled, we got to rely
on ourselves, we got to do whatever we can. We got to make our IP system better,
and stronger to stimulate innovation. That's probably part of the things that, Judge
Michel was talking about, "We got to do whatever we can." On the other side, we
know the game, we know the competition is very significant. I think that deep
inside I'm guessing none of us believe IP protection is enough for innovation. IP
never equals innovation, right? It's one of the really important conditions. It's
really not probably one of the only things.
I think actually there's already-- I'm betting on there's probably some
conversations coming up soon in China. That well, if the IP is not sufficient, what
else? If the IP is not sufficient, why do we need to spend so many resources on IP
protection, but right now we still believe the IP is very critical. That's why China
throws out this policy about the big IP protection. We have the whole process
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protection for IP, so spend a lot of effort on the IP protection. In a way it's a pretty
golden time in China being an IP lawyer. Hugh, that's why I'm not in a hurry to
open up offices in the US. China really now has infrastructure. I'm arguing, okay?
I'm arguing China has the infrastructure ready for realizing IP values.
Looking at our courts, we have many more international IP courts now.
We're thinking about upgrading our CFC type of courts. We're sending a lot of
trained patent examiners to the court to be the technical investigators. Our judges
have no technical issues they cannot understand because they have very capable
technical investigators as those in Japan. Of course, there are some arguments
why that's a problem.
Then there are lots of new things. One small example I can give to you,
China, actually are looking at TPP viewers. Now we call CPTPP because
Americans back out of it. One of the things about it, a well-known trademark.
Now in China, some local government, even before China joins it, actually adopt
CPTPP rules and well known trademark. Unregistered well known trademark can
be protected across the class. Patent linkage, we have a patent office working
around the clock on the patent linkage cases, but somehow the Chinese court beat
them first. The first patent linkage case just came out with the decision against
innovators, against originators.
Now researchers in the state owned institutes have much bigger freedom
now to monetize their patents. They can sell their patents, like draw the cash, like
ATM. In the state owned institutes, this is a government policy to stimulate
innovation. Our own companies, now we talk about anti-suit injunctions. I think
Judge Arnold is going to talk about China. Now, our own company ZTE is suing
our own Chinese company Tinno for the global FRAND rate setting, so our courts
is working on that. Huawei is really openly talking about a licensing program.
They only making like 1.3 billion as revenues.
There's lot of things that are going on, but the problem is, as I said, it's
probably not enough. It's never enough. No matter how much IP protection you
have, the innovation may not be really there. I think right now as an IP lawyer, I'm
actually a little bit curious about what the IP is, and whose IP it is. I'm concerned
if that innovation we want is not coming, are we still relevant? That's the world
we are dealing with. I'm researching on the COVID the vaccine patent waiver
policy. This is just a very interesting example about when public health policy
comes in where the IP is. I'll just pause here, I think my time is up. Hugh, you're
mute.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Unmuted. There are so many things going on in
China. You're Chinese. How long have you been Chinese? Quite a while. To
what--
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HE JING: Except for five years in the US, I'm still Chinese, not even
Chinese Americans.
HUGH C. HANSEN: No, hold it. To what extent that you get involved in
IP, which drags you out to international stuff and other things away? Think about
especially the US, because the US, frankly is god, in terms of IP. We all have to
recognize that, but we'll discuss that with Richard. Does that make you change at
all, that you're more international? You're more this, less maybe Chinese? I think,
to some degree, in the U.S. if you're dealing with Europe a lot and everything
else, your views become less, I don't know, solid in one area. Is that true for you
in China?
HE JING: I'm guessing you're, I don't know, maybe you're probably
maybe pointing to something about us in terms of identity, whether Chinese,
American, International.
HUGH C. HANSEN: No, no.
HE JING: Yesterday I actually run a very interesting webinar on
globalization, when looking at whether Ukrainian war is ending the globalization
as we know of. This is something that we are deeply realizing it is a part of the
context, we talk about almost anything, that economic globalization is probably
ending. Now, when were looking at what is really coming, we're looking at all the
securities, the security, the trust, you're talking about FRAND. I was reading the
speech of Yellen at the Atlantic Council. We're seeing that wow, this is a policy
speech talking about America will never allow anyone to take advantage of raw
materials supply chain to weaken America's ability for unwanted geopolitical
advantage. I think IP is already part of it. In China, we are now linking IP to
national security. Whether I'm a Chinese or not, it forces me to look at something
maybe at the bigger picture.
HUGH C. HANSEN: All right. Any comments or thoughts? Renata, you
can jump in on any of this stuff. I told Renata at first, "Don't say anything," but
I'm retracting that now. Please feel free to say anything you want.
RENATA B. HESSE: Thank you. Thank you, Hugh. I'm the lowly antitrust
lawyer in all this. I'm waiting for my moment to debate Paul on injunctions and
eBay.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. Is your life better, the same, or worse in the
last year or two than it had been previous to that?
HE JING: It's probably more-HUGH C. HANSEN: Just between us. Just between us. You don't have toHE JING: [laughs] The mixed answer would be worst in a way, good in a
way, better in a way. Better in a way I'm growing a new law firm. It's very
exciting. We’ve got a new law firm with 100 people. Worse in a way that I'm
definitely spending much less time with my family. It's a cause I'm realizing. The
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good thing is I'm a keep communicating love to my family, so they know even
though they don't spend enough time. they know that the love is there.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Now, are you still thinking of a U.S. law firm, and
moving, at least have an office in the U.S.?
HE JING: The funny thing, I'm very pragmatic actually. Like you say,
you're realistic. I think it's probably better these days for Chinese law firms to set
up office maybe in Brussels and Europe. I think Chinese companies are moving to
Europe, they think that the U.S. is decoupling them anyway. Our companies are
pulling away from the stock market from New York. We are in a very strange time
actually, very strange time.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Et tu.
HE JING: We thought Americans also want to win the Europeans over as
well.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Et tu, He Jing, this is really kind of sad. Brussels and
all, you were going to be in a hardcore U.S. country. I love Brussels actually. I
actually love Europe and London.
HE JING: If we can't go to Europe, maybe Africa is another country we're
going to look into, keep in mind Belt and Road.
HUGH C. HANSEN: All right. Thank you very much. Now we're going to
move on to Richard. How are you doing Richard?
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: Fine, thank you.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay.
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: Enjoying being at Fordham as always, of
course.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Now, everyone, did you see what Richard said?
Learn from that in the future. Okay? All of you. All right. Good. Thank you,
Richard. It's all yours.
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: In that case, I'm going to share my screen if
everybody doesn't mind. Sorry, I just need to get the right screen. I check that I've
got the right screen. Hopefully you've got my presentation. Is that correct?
HUGH C. HANSEN: Don't ask me.
RENATA B. HESSE: We had the slides, but now we have your menu.
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: Sorry.
RENATA B. HESSE: We're not seeing the slides anymore. We were a
moment ago, but now it looks like they minimized on your screen.
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: Excuse me for that. Apologies. Let me try
again. Do you have the slides now?
RENATA B. HESSE: No.
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: No. Apologies for the technical incompetence,
but there is a reason for doing this.
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COURTNEY SOLIDAY: Richard, it's Courtney. Justice Arnold, excuse
me. I'll let you try again and then if not, I can pull them up.
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: Are we there yet?
HUGH C. HANSEN: No, not yet. All right.
RENATA B. HESSE: There we are.
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: Are you there?
HUGH C. HANSEN: Yes.
RENATA B. HESSE: Yes, we go them.
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: Wonderful. I apologize it's taken me so long.
I'm talking about Legally Enforceable Global Arbitration of SEP/FRAND
Disputes. I think everybody knows the problem that we have in this area by now,
which is that patents are territorial, whereas standards and FRAND are global. We
have jurisdictional disputes. We have anti-suit injunctions, anti anti-suit
injunctions, you name it.
Recently, of course, we've had the EU's WTO complaint against China
about anti-suit injunctions granted by the Chinese courts. It seems to me the
essential question that that complaint raises is who should decide the terms of
FRAND licenses of SEPs on a global basis. As everybody knows, Western SEP
holders typically want Western courts to decide, or Chinese implementers
typically want Chinese courts to decide, but it's not just about Western versus
Chinese, there are concerns elsewhere in the world, and this problem is the same
whatever the nationality of the parties.
What we need is a supranational procedure for resolving these disputes,
which is acceptable to everybody. No national courts can do that. The obvious
answer is arbitration on a global basis. This has many advantages, which I'm
listing on the screen here. You can get to the core issue of the terms of a FRAND
license directly. You don't need to have all this complex and expensive
preliminary litigation over patent infringement and validity. You can avoid the
need for litigation in many territories, you don't need to rush to court, you don't
need to have anti-suit injunctions.
FRAND terms for the whole world can be determined by one tribunal, no
risk of inconsistent decisions. You can have a multinational tribunal, and you can
force the awards under the New York convention. What's not to like? Why doesn't
everybody do it? The answer is because it's not a legally enforceable requirement.
Therefore, when you have a dispute, one party or the other thinks it may be able
to do better by litigating. Therefore, to make a solution to these problems, what
you need is to make it a legally enforceable obligation.
Now, there is precedent for arbitration clauses in some SDO IPR policies,
but you need to make them legally binding on both members and non-members of
the organizations and on both patentees and implementers. Can we do that? I've
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put forward a proposal, which I don't pretend is without flaws, but it is at any rate
a proposal as to how to achieve this. Step one, we include an arbitration clause in
the contract formed between the patentee and the SDO under the IPR policy.
Requiring a patentee who has made a declaration of essentiality, and who has a
dispute with an implementer as the terms of a license for SEP to enter into
arbitration. That has all the details you need about the arbitral rules and so on. The
effect of that, if courts enforce it, is that the implementer can enforce the
arbitration clause against the patentee to obtain a stay if the patentee brings
infringement proceedings.
Then step two, the IPR policy should provide that a second contract is
formed when an implementer makes a statement of compliance with the standard
under which the implementer undertakes to the SDO to take a license of any SEPs
on FRAND terms, and in return, receives the benefit of such a license. This
contract should then contain a mirror image arbitration clause to the arbitration
clause in the first contract.
Effect of that, again, assuming courts are willing to enforce, is that this
time, if the implementer brings proceedings, then they can likewise be a stay
obtained. This way, either party can obtain a stay of court proceedings brought by
the other party falling within the scope of the arbitration clause. That being the
proposal, what are the objections to it? So far, I've counted six main objections.
Objection number one is you can't oust the right of a party to have access
to the court because this is a constitutional or a human right. My answer to that
objection is well, this is what arbitration clauses do all the time in other contexts,
such as commodities contracts, but of course, that doesn't mean say you can't have
at least limited review by courts of arbitral awards, e.g. for manifest error of law.
It doesn't mean that there's a complete absence of court supervision. What it
means is that your primary tribunal is the arbitral tribunal.
Objection number two is a variant of objection number one, which is, I've
heard it say that you can't do this under EU law, but I don't think that's right. This
is commercial arbitration, and therefore, it shouldn't be contrary to EU law.
Objection number three is that an arbitral panel would have no jurisdiction to
determine the validity of SEPs to which the answer is absolutely right, but it
doesn't matter because you wouldn't need to do that. What the arbitral panel
would need to do is take a view on the strength of the patentee's portfolio, but
that's all they need to do and the arbitration clause wouldn't stop implementers
from commencing revocation proceedings, but they're very unlikely to do that
worldwide.
Objection number four, is that arbitration is undesirable because it lacks
positive externalities, use the economist jargon because it doesn't provide
transparency and precedents. My answer to that is, well, arbitration doesn't have
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to be completely secret. There are plenty of contexts in which arbitral awards are
published, and we should make this one of them. Objection number five, is that
arbitration is undesirable because arbitral tribunals lack the power to obtain
disclosure of prior license agreements entered into by the parties. My answer to
that is that's incorrect. It can be done provided you've got appropriate procedural
rules, and in fact, it has been done in a small number of arbitrations.
The last one that I've come across is that it can't be done because it
requires everybody in an SDO, all the members to consent. That's true, at least
with some of the SDOs like ETSI, but the answer to that is, that's a political
question, why shouldn't you ask people if they will consent, and maybe the
antitrust authorities can persuade people, it's in their own best interests. That is a
quick counter through my proposal. I'm not saying I've got the answer to
everything, but my challenge is, if anybody else has got a better answer, put it
forward.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Which means actually, Richard, you are saying you
have the best answer, but you're trying to say it in a polite way. Okay. Excellent.
Renata, Paul, Denny, or Jing, any comments or thoughts for Richard before we
move on to the general discussion?
PAUL R. MICHEL: I think there is a great role for arbitration where the
parties consent. The problem with the proposal, which I think has a wonderful
goal, is that it requires the SDOs to be willing to do this and so far, they've shown
inclination to be completely unwilling to make such requirements so that's a
problem.
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: If I could just come back on that. I acknowledge
the fact that so far, the SDOs have been a little reluctant, but then think about how
they adopted IPR policies in the first place. They were reluctant to do that, and
they were persuaded by the antitrust authorities that it was in their own best
interests, and they did so. Maybe history could repeat itself.
RENATA B. HESSE: When I was at DOJ, I spent a fair amount of time
speaking with people at SDOs, about the FRAND issue and how to figure out a
better way to navigate these licensing disputes, which seem to be intractable and
we're spending a lot of resources both at the SEPs and SDOs and amongst the
participants. To Judge Michel’s point, there was relatively little appetite, I guess,
for two things.
One is for the SDO to take on the burden of mandating a resolution and
the other is, I think one of your objections that you laid out was that there really
was no consensus amongst the two sides of the debate about whether arbitration
was good and in some cases, both sides of the debate agree that they didn't like
arbitration. I don't know that I have a better solution. I've often thought that it
would be when the antitrust authorities urged the SDOs, and the participants in
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the SDOs to develop policies that provided greater clarity about what FRAND
meant.
There was tremendous resistance to compromising and reaching a policy
that bridged the gaps between the implementer and the patent holder’s side. I'm
not confident that you're going to be able to get the SDOs to do this or to get the
members of the SDOs to really push for it.
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: I understand that, and of course, there are other
things that need attention. I'm not saying that this is the only issue in the FRAND
space that needs attention. There's other things that need attention, of course, but
the thing is, how do we deal with this fundamental jurisdictional issue? Because
that's what the WTO complaint is all about. It's all about the EU saying, "Oh, my
God, the Chinese courts have started doing what we used to do and granting
anti-suit injunctions and, "Oh my God, it's terrible."
Why was it not a problem when we did it? I'm not quite sure what the
answer to that is. Apparently, if Chinese courts do it, it's all wrong and it's breach
of TRIPS, but if European courts and U.S. courts do it, it's fine. The only answer
to that is to have a supernational body and what supernational body do we have?
Answer, arbitrable tribunals. I can't see any other one.
[crosstalk]
RENATA B. HESSE: This is just a dumb antitrust lawyer's question. I
couldn't really understand how the court in the UK and Unwired Planet believed it
could impose worldwide rates for patents that were not UK patents. How does it
do that? What jurisdiction does it have to do that?
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: The answer is straightforward. The only
jurisdiction he has is in respect to the UK patent. We grant an injunction in respect
to the UK patent unless a FRAND license is taken. If the terms of the FRAND
license are global, then that's the option that the implementer has, they either take
the FRAND license on global terms, or alternatively, if they don't want to do that,
then they've got to comply with the injunction and that may mean staying out of
the UK.
RENATA B. HESSE: But only the UK?
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: Only the UK.
HE JING: Just so you know that China is now working on its own
intellectual property arbitration center. It's a new creature so this actually goes
back to what Hugh asked me earlier, this is really against the Chinese arbitration
place, or international, or global. China probably could have pulled some of the
international judges or former judges over to be the arbitrators, and offer that, or
maybe even linked to someone in Japan, or make it international. I think
everybody agree, arbitration is the one, it is a solution. The key thing is create
something that's acceptable for companies around the world. Otherwise, there'll
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be another round of a fight. If you're looking at WTO as a better system is
collapsing already.
RENATA B. HESSE: Would it be another possible path to have these
SDOs do something about determining actual validity and essentiality?
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: It's very difficult though. Because the problem
is when you've got a large portfolio, of course, if it's small, it's less of an issue, but
this issue becomes particularly prominent with the larger portfolios. It's an awful
lot of work to assess validity and to assess essentiality particularly if you're going
to do both of those exercises and not just one of them. The question is who does it
and who pays?
RENATA B. HESSE: Doesn't that same issue come up in the arbitration or
shouldn't it? Let me put it differently.
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: Well, in the arbitration context, it's easier to
handle because you can do it for example, through sampling mechanisms, which
is typically what's been done in the arbitrations that have been held in this space.
I'm not suggesting that these problems suddenly disappear, but they get much
more manageable. Because you only have to do it once for the whole world and
you can do it on a sampling basis. You can make it manageable. There have been
successful arbitrations for FRAND disputes of set portfolios, just a relatively
limited number of them.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. All right, Denny, did you have something to
say it looked like you were? No? Okay. He Jing, let me ask you a question, you
said, you gung-ho on getting in the United States, as part of your office. Now
you're thinking Brussels, is that because our supreme court has screwed up patent
law so much that nobody stays in U.S. anymore to discuss patents, they're all
overseas, and that you would end up with no clients, is that what's going on here?
HE JING: Probably not your supreme court, probably your BIS, the
department of commerce all the export control, the entity lists, all the sanctions,
and all the SEC and all this Foreign Companies Accountability Act. It's a general
suit. I think, like I said, there is a general consensus here, Americans has a
consensus. It's got to be decoupling on technology side.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. I've already asked Paul, he was a judge and
now he's been freed almost. He broke free and now he can live again. It sounded
great, so Denny and Richard, Denny, you've both been court of first instance or
appellate court. If you would have to do the rest from beginning of your life, court
of first instance or appellate court, which would you choose? Start with Denny.
DENNY CHIN: I enjoyed the trial court more, and I think, among other
things, you can do your own thing. You can write your own opinion. You don't
have to compromise, you don't have to hondle with colleagues. You don't need a
second vote, and I think there's just a greater variety in what you do.
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HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. Richard?
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: I enjoyed both. I had a great time as a trial court
judge. I'm having a great time now. Of course, under our system, I can't do what I
do now without having been a trial court judge first. I've never had the possibility
of only choosing one. If you see what I mean. If I have been forced to choose one,
I really don't know what I would choose because as I say, I'm really enjoying
myself now, even though I had a great time at first instance.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. Weaselly, but still, all right. Now in our free
and open, I'll hold it. Are there questions? Let me look for you guys in the chat.
RENATA B. HESSE: There are a lot of them in the Q & A, Hugh.
HUGH C. HANSEN: All right. Well, why don't we just start going down?
Paul, would the award of attorney's fees help?
PAUL R. MICHEL: Sure, but it's hard to do because patent cases are so
complicated, and you have so many different issues. There's so many times where
the litigation as positioned is not frivolous. It's not implausible, it's not
unreasonable, but it may in the end be unsuccessful. Where it can be done, it
should be done. I think judges are a little more reluctant than they should be to
shift costs. As a general proposition, I don't think in the U.S. we're ever going to
get to a major cost-shifting regime, like “loser pays.”.
HUGH C. HANSEN: All right. Paul, there's a question from Josh Landau,
can you read that in the chat, question and answer? It's at the Q & A at the bottom
and just click on it.
PAUL R. MICHEL: Well, I don't think that his question goes to whether
injunctions are appropriate or not. It seems to me he's referring to whether
damages, if that was the final determination, would cover things well beyond
what was patented. Obviously, they shouldn't, but that's a defect in damages law. I
think the damages law, for decades, has been underdeveloped and unclear in the
U.S. and the Federal Circuit has not done a good job in my opinion of making it
more predictable, more consistent, more rational, more economically sound, and
that should be done. I hope it will be done, but that's really a damages issue, not
an injunction issue in my view.
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: Maybe I could chip in because I don't think the
audience can see the question. The question that's asked is this, "Where is the
equity in giving injunctions, which permit the extraction of value outside of the
patented technology to those whose only interest in litigation is monetary?" Now
that's a very loaded question if I may say so. In the first place, what patentee
brings litigation, except for monetary reasons? I'm sorry, you don't have moral
rights in patents. In copyright, you've got moral rights for sure, but people only
litigate patents for monetary reasons.
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That seems quite a strange way of putting it, but also Josh refers to injunctions,
which permit the extraction of value outside of the patented technology. Well, that
shouldn't happen. A well-crafted injunction should only prevent the use of the
patented technology. If it is actually being used for other purposes, then
something is wrong with the injunction. The answer to that is not to stop granting
injunctions, it's to be careful about the tailoring of injunctions.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. That sounds good. All right.
RENATA B. HESSE: Just one quick thing. I think in fairness to Josh, I
think what he is talking about, but I don't know in terms of the monetization point,
and I do think this is an issue that contributes to the reluctance in some cases to
give injunctions. Is that in the US, at least there's been a huge focus on monetizing
patent portfolios, which has very little to do with actually putting the patents into
our product and then getting a royalty for the practicing of the patent by an
implementer, and has more to do with aggregating patents and monetizing them in
ways that, I think some people view to be anticompetitive, which is different than
just obviously getting a royalty.
I think what he's talking about is extracting a rents that are beyond the
value of the actual patented technology by using litigation tools and patent
aggregationHUGH C. HANSEN: [crosstalk] 25 minutes?
RENATA B. HESSE: -lack of transparency, I think but Josh could jump in
for itself in the chat.
HUGH C. HANSEN: [crosstalk] 20 on that.
PAUL R. MICHEL: Well, he's assuming the result, he's assuming that
there's this kind of extraction when I don't see any evidence of it. Of course, it's
possible, and it may happen in some cases, but he's assuming that happens all the
time. I don't see any basis for that assumption.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. All righty, let's move on then. We got other
questions. Jenny Pariser, by the way, I think everybody can see the questions, in
the Q & A that are out in the audience or not. If I'm mistaken, someone should tell
me that. Denny, are you looking at that? There's a question to you.
DENNY CHIN: Yes, I see it. Let me clarify, when I refer to sitting days,
I'm referring to appeals, in the circuit, we have sitting days. There have been
fewer sitting days because there are fewer appeals. Ironically, in the trial court, the
filings are up. It's inconsistent that the filings are up in the trial court, but the
appeals are down. It just means, there are fewer people who are losing, who are
appealing. I believe that both jury and bench trials are down. I talked a little bit
before about some of the reasons why it's across the board, both civil and
criminal. The changes in sentencing law, for example, change in priorities, but I
do think a big part of the story is that litigation is too expensive.
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To take a case through motion practice, through discovery, through
additional motion practice, then into the trial, and then to have the expense of
appeals after that, it is such a great expense that many people are electing to,
resolve the matters rather than to go full steam ahead.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Denny, let me ask you a question, when you're a
district court judge and you are writing an opinion, to what extent are you
thinking, "I want to write an opinion that won't be appealed or appealed, I'm
okay," that has some effect of what you were put in, as opposed to just on the
merits before you?
DENNY CHIN: No, it's a factor. I think part of it is what is the status? If
I'm denying a motion for summary judgment, for example, I can keep it very short
and simple. Here are the issues of fact, motion denied. I'm writing that opinion
just for the parties. If something is likely to be appealed, if I'm going to grant
summary judgment, I want to try to make it, less likely to be reversed. I'll write a
somewhat different opinion. On occasion, there'll be something that's really
important, really high profile, really significant there. You're writing, not just for
the parties, not just for the court of appeals, but also for the public. Depending on
what's going to happen, what you think might happen, you would take on the
writing differently.
HUGH C. HANSEN: It's interesting, you're talking about summary
judgment, which I think is the friend of the district court judge if I had to guess.
Second circuit and in like a 1940 opinion said, "You can't have summary
judgment because of the seventh amendment, right to a jury trial," and you're
taking that away. Obviously, this is the whole swings the other way, and maybe
litigants like it, maybe the judges like it, the court of appeals likes it because yes
or no, you can get rid of this thing. You don't have to do too much on it. The role
of summary judgment seems to me has dramatically increased, and that has some
effect on what people do, right? Or am I wrong?
DENNY CHIN: No, I think that's true. There was a professor who wrote a
law review article a few years back saying that summary judgment is
unconstitutional precisely for the reason that you said. There definitely is a role
for summary judgment. If there are no genuine issues of fact, there's no point in
having a trial, but I think as I was saying earlier too, there are probably more
12(b)(6) motions being granted, and with more summary judgment motions being
granted, I think that's probably true, and therefore fewer trials.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay, thanks. Bartow, are you there?
DENNY CHIN: She doesn't have a question. She's just saying hooray for
practice.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Yes. I want to know exactly what her hooray is
because I don't think I authorized that. What is that for?
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RENATA B. HESSE: I think it was for Judge Chin's note that the bench had
diversified considerably.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. Now, all right.
DENNY CHIN: I joined in that hooray then.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Now, hold on. Let me ask a question. 10,15 years
ago, 20 years, Denny, would you want to be known as Denny Chin, which you
were, just Denny Chin, or Denny Chin, a Chinese American judge, which would
you prefer people to think of it?
DENNY CHIN: I would prefer to be known as Denny Chin, a very good
judge, period. The fact of the matter is many people probably looked at me and
said, he's one of four or five Asian American judges in the whole country. It's like
Jeremy Lin, it's not just Jeremy Lin, it's the Asian American basketball player, and
so part of the concern is if Jeremy Lin messes up, it's not just Jeremy Lin messing
up. It's the Asian American basketball player messing up. That is part of the issue
here.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. Ansley. All right. I think this is for Richard.
You want to look at that?
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: Yes. I think I've answered both of Ansley's
questions already. The first is about-HUGH C. HANSEN: No, then that's okay. Then if you've answered it,
then we don't have to do it. All right. Ansley is now asking another question and
that's, by the way-RICHARD D. ARNOLD: Again, that's the transparency issue, which
again, I've answered, which is to say, you don't have to do it all behind closed
doors. The more interesting question, which I haven't already touched on is Carlo
Lavizzari's question about, whether this applies downstream. Of course, this is
still a hot topic in FRAND disputes is where the appropriate licensing level is. I
don't want to make any pronouncements about what legally is the correct answer,
because that's something I might have to adjudicate upon. As a match for
practicality, it seems to me that there is a lot to be said for licensing at the level of
the consumer artifacts.
We're familiar with this in the case of mobile phones, you license the
mobile phone and therefore the license extends to all of the components of that
mobile phone, Although that's been resisted in the case of automobiles, it seems to
me that as a matter of practicality, it makes a lot of sense there too. You license
the automobile and that includes all the components within it. The point as to why
that's a practical solution is that in those circumstances, the royalty burden doesn't
make anybody bankrupt down the chain. That seems to me to be a quite important
consideration, but as I say, that's not a legal analysis, that's a practical analysis.
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HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay. All right. I want everyone to look at Gordon
Humphreys. I'm not sure who's direct-- Oh, maybe Richard again, and answer his
questions. The last question in the Q & A.
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: Yes, Gordon's asking about whether there's a
role for the WIPO IP arbitration and media center. Yes. Potentially that they could
provide a suitable arbitral tribunal. I certainly wouldn't rule that out and on the
contrary, I would encourage them to try and step up and solve this problem.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Okay.
HE JING: They actually have an office in Shanghai, the arbitration center
actually wrote the paper to them, have someone talk to them, but they're very
silent. WIPO looks like, for some reason, they're quiet about this.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Let me ask you this, all of you. Is being in the law
better than it used to be the same or worse?
PAUL R. MICHEL: It's better for the judges because there's more
challenge. It's worse for a lot of the clients because judges are over-extended into
areas where their grasp of details and nuances is I think very limited, particularly
in the economic and business realm.
HUGH C. HANSEN: It's better or worse for the judges?
PAUL R. MICHEL: It's more fun for the judges because they have a
greater variety of very challenging, interesting issues, but it's worse for the clients
because they're getting subpar results from people who are beyond their level of
comfort and competence.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Now, hold on, hold on. If you want to read back my
question, I wasn't asking about clients and everything else, I was asking about you
as individuals, don't try to avoid this deep theory, factual questions, Paul. For you,
right this now, is being in the law, which you are incredibly, admirably in it better,
the same or worse than let's say 5, 10 years ago or pick any period?
PAUL R. MICHEL: I think for results, it's worse because I can't seem to
get the Congress or the patent office or the FDA or the district courts or the
federal circuit to do what I think they need to do. It's more frustrating, but it also
has more promise. How to net that out is a little bit unclear, but I'm a volunteer
like a marine. I'm doing what I want to do, what I like to do and I'm not
complaining about it, but it's really hard to deal with people outside legal
expertise and patents, antitrust, and other tightly related areas because they just
don't understand anything and it's very difficult to educate and convince them and
understandably so but it creates a big problem.
HUGH C. HANSEN: I can absolutely see that and I agree with you on that
from my perspective.
DENNY CHIN: I think things are worse than they were some years ago
and I think it's in part because of where we are, the country is so politicized, the
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country is so divided, we're also into our second year of a pandemic. I think the
polarization of the country has carried over somewhat into the judicial system.
The picking of judges has become incredibly partisan. The decision-makers used
to want to pick moderate judges who were concerned about doing the right thing
and weren't agenda-driven. Unfortunately, I think things have changed.
HUGH C. HANSEN: I agree with you on that too. That leaves three
people who have to answer this question, or they won't be allowed to leave.
RENATA B. HESSE: I'll round out the U.S. before you go to China and
the UK. I think it's less pleasant for some of the reasons that Judge Chin just
mentioned. I think there's a lot less interest in having real intellectual discussions
about what the law says or should say, and a lot more name-calling and
personalization. I think that that just makes the practice less enjoyable.
HE JING: I think in China, being the laws, I think still getting better. As I
said, China build a better and better infrastructure so it's more people, more
competent, and learning to take advantage. In that sense, it is but in a way that we
know the problem is getting bigger and bigger and it takes a lot more to make a
real difference.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Is it easier to be Chinese now than it was? Easier or
harder to be Chinese now, He Jing, than it was let's say about 5, 10 years ago?
HE JING: It's easier, but also accountability is, it's also bigger. I think it's
really time for Chinese to step up.
HUGH C. HANSEN: To what extent, I'm recording this for the Chinese
government, you may not realize this, but to what extent, do you now have to
worry about things like that where maybe before you could just be He Jing?
HE JING: Oh, I definitely watch myself a lot more when the IP is linked to
national security. That's our policy's theme actually here, even though I don't quite
know what it really means.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Richard, you've already answered a question along
these lines, but not the actual question which is, well, you know what it is. What's
your answer?
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: I'm going to try and answer the question you
asked, rather than looking at it more widely. For me personally, I would say it's
better, in part that's just for obvious reasons, going up the system and all of that,
but also, the great thing about what we do is we learn every day and so I know
more than I did before and there's still more to learn, which is great.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Now, how many years did you spend in PR because
it's worked wonders for you. Okay, all right. We still have as I see it in my
calculation, I think we have about five minutes left for this discussion. Is there
anything anyone wants to add or discuss or think about?
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HE JING: I want to advertise for our China law session at sunrise
tomorrow, especially for those colleagues in European timezone. We have a great
panel, Michael Dean, talking about multinational perspectives, we have a China
global company talk about their view. The theme is about what's going to be
possible, what will look like in five years in China IP. For the friends, the
colleagues, who are curious about what's going on, you're more than welcome to
join, 6:30.
HUGH C. HANSEN: You're talking about the first session tomorrow?
HE JING: Yes, sunrise.
HUGH C. HANSEN: I don't know why you did it, but you scheduled it at
some ungodly hour in the morning.
HE JING: That's the only available time slot, that's really for our European
friends.
HUGH C. HANSEN: Everyone, we're recording this so two days from
now, you can listen to this or listen to that or listen to whatever. It's $5 every time
you do it, but what's $5 nowadays, that's pretty easy going there. There's a
reception, lady and gentleman, after the last session, which is three and I just want
to remind you that. You probably think I'm wonderfully, technically advanced but
the fact of the matter is, I'm not. I can even do this reception where the tables and
you can move around and everything else, which is incredible.
I actually think it's interesting this Remo reception might even be better
than the live reception because the live reception, you go to a table people you
know, you're not actually going to say, "See you later,' or this or this or this. You
actually that's good but you could have had lunch with them or something else.
Actually, meeting people and talking to people you don't know, is something that
can happen with this more easily. In any case, I advise you all to think about it
and I hope you'll be able to. It's three o'clock Eastern, that's United States.
Now, one of the things you probably have to think is there's a good reason
why the two of you are not in the United States, one is in the UK and the other is
in China. Really come on, think of all the [crosstalk]
RICHARD D. ARNOLD: It's because you're not doing it in person, Hugh,
if you were doing in person, I would be there.
HE JING: Are we going to have that next year?
HUGH C. HANSEN: I'm not talking that, I'm talking about your life.
You've decided to stay in the UK, you've decided to stay in China. You could be
here for heaven's sakes. All right. It's your decision, I guess I can't affect that, that
much.
HE JING: You're very infectious, I will rethink.

26

Session 1B
HUGH C. HANSEN: No. All right. Well, thank you, everybody. This has
been great. I've really enjoyed it. Stay safe, everybody, and I hope to see some of
you at three o'clock.
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